AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION: Ethics

AREAS OF (TEACHING) COMPETENCE: Applied Ethics, Modern Philosophy, Existentialism, Ancient Greek Philosophy

ACADEMIC EMPLOYMENT:
Eastern Kentucky University, Assistant Professor, to commence August 2009
Truman State University, Temporary Assistant Professor, Fall 2008-Summer 2009
University of Arkansas:
 - Lecturer, Fall 2007–Spring 2008
 - Graduate Assistant, Fall 2002–Spring 2008
Northwest Arkansas Community College, Instructor, Summer 2006–Summer 2008 (including Fall and Spring semesters)

EDUCATION:
University of Arkansas:
- Ph.D. Philosophy, 2008 (Dissertation director: Edward Minar)
- M.A. Philosophy, 2004
- B.A. English (Creative Writing emphasis), 2002

PROFESSIONAL PUBLICATIONS:
“Against the Intrinsic Value of Pleasure,” (2009) Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. 23, No. 1
“Moral Blindness and Moral Progress,” (2007) Review Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 5
“Wittgenstein, Ethics, and Nonsense,” (2007) Analysis and Metaphysics, Vol. 6 (invited)

PRESENTATIONS:
"Moral Conviction and Disagreement: Getting Beyond (Negative) Toleration," to be presented at the 2009 Concerned Philosophers for Peace Conference, University of Dayton (Ohio), November 2009
"Moral Conviction and Character," to be presented at the Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress II, University of Colorado Boulder, August 2009
“Happiness and the Environment,” Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference: The Environment, University of Idaho and Washington State University, May 2009
“Happiness and Sustainability,” Human Flourishing and Restoration in the Age of Global Warming, Clemson University, September 2008
“Moral Realism and Ways of Life”
        - Central APA Annual Meeting (Chicago, IL), April 2008
        - Southwestern Philosophical Society Conference (San Antonio, TX), November 2007; subsequently to be published in Southwest Philosophy Review (forthcoming)
“A Non-Cognitive Realism? - Hume on Moral Feeling,” Society for Student Philosophers' Group Session at the Central APA Annual Meeting, April 2007
“Moral Conflict and the Indeterminacy of Morality,” Southwest Philosophical Society Conference (Nashville, TN), November 2006; subsequently published Southwest Philosophy Review, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2007)
“Feeling and Moral Perception,” Northwest Conference on Philosophy, (Seattle, WA), October 2005
“Wittgenstein, Ethics, and Nonsense,” Midsouth Philosophy Conference, (Memphis, TN), February 2005
“What Do We Need Happiness For?” St. Louis University Department of Philosophy Graduate Student Conference, September 2004

PROFESSIONAL SERVICE:
Writing Advisor for Senior Seminar (and advisor for two senior thesis projects), Truman State University, Department of Philosophy and Religion, Spring 2009
Editorial Assistant for Philosophical Topics, August 2007-July 2008

MAINSTREAM PUBLICATIONS:
“Happiness, Virtue and Tyranny,” (2008) Philosophy Now, Issue 68
“Contemplating Suicide – What It Takes and What It Gives Back,” (2004) Clamor, No. 25

INFORMAL PRESENTATIONS:
“Is Morality Subjective?” Fayetteville High School Philosophy Club, October 2007
“Happiness: Is It All in Your Head?” Socratic Society (University of Arkansas Undergraduate Philosophy Club), March 2007
“Subjectivism & Error: How Could I Be Wrong About What's Right (For Me)?” Socratic Society, March 2006
“What Do You Want To Do With Your Life?” University of Arkansas Graduate Student Meeting, October 2004
“Contemplating Suicide,” Socratic Society, November 2003

BOOK REVIEWS:
Critical reviews for Metapsychology (http://mentalhelp.net/books, ISSN 1931-5716):
 - Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Ethical Theory, November 2007
 - John F. Schumaker, In Search of Happiness, June 2007
 - Richard Double, Metaethical Subjectivism, June 2006
 - Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry Into Moral Agency, August 2005
 - Barry Rosenfeld, Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die, June 2005
 - Alan Millar, Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation, May 2005
 - Thomas Szasz, Fatal Freedom: The Ethics and Politics of Suicide, January 2005
 - Jonathan Lear, Therapeutic Action: An Earnest Plea For Irony, November 2004
 - Edwin S. Shneidman, Autopsy of a Suicidal Mind, July 2004

AWARDS AND DISTINCTIONS:
Best Proposal by a Graduate Student, Conference on Human Flourishing and Restoration in the Age of Global Warming, September 2008
Graduate Student Travel Stipend, Central APA Meeting, April 2008
Philip S. Bashor Scholarship, for outstanding graduate work in the University of Arkansas Philosophy Department, April 2006
Thomas Vernon Award, for outstanding teaching by a graduate assistant in the University of Arkansas Philosophy Department, April 2005
Magna Cum Laude, University of Arkansas, May 2002
Chancellor’s Scholar, University of Arkansas, 1998-2002

COURSES TAUGHT, UNDERWAY, & IN PREPARATION:
Happiness and the Good Life (Truman State, to be taught Spring 2009)
History of Western Philosophy II—17th and 18th Century Philosophy (Truman State)
Philosophy and Public Affairs (Truman State)
Ethics (Truman State, Arkansas)
Introduction to Philosophy, primary sources (Arkansas)
Introduction to Philosophy, textbook (Northwest Arkansas Community College)
Logic (Arkansas)

GRADUATE COURSES TAKEN:
Classical Ethical Theory (Richard Lee)
Contemporary Ethical Theory (Richard Lee)
Special Readings: Metaethics (Richard Lee, independent study)
Social and Political Philosophy (Tatiana Patrone)
Wittgenstein Seminar (Ed Minar, taken once for credit, also audited)
19th Century Continental Philosophy (Ed Minar)
20th Century Continental Philosophy (Ed Minar)
History of Analytic Philosophy (Ed Minar)
Kierkegaard Seminar (Andrew Cross)
Philosophy of Mind (Jack Lyons)
Epistemology Seminar: Basic Beliefs (Jack Lyons)
Perception Seminar (Jack Lyons)
Theoretical Rationality Seminar (Eric Funkhouser)
Modern Philosophy (Jacob Adler; also audited Jack Lyons’ Modern course)
Ancient Greek Philosophy (Lynne Spellman)
Neoplatonism (Lynne Spellman)
Symbolic Logic (Barry Ward)

COMPREHENSIVE EXAMS TAKEN FOR PH.D.:
Ethical Theory
Ancient Greek Philosophy
Modern Philosophy
History of Analytic Philosophy

DISSERTATION SUMMARY: Subjectivism, Realism, and Morality: Moral subjectivism—taken broadly as the view that moral values are grounded by personal convictions and experiences and that moral judgments are justified by those factors—appears to offer an appealing account of the nature of moral value. Reflection on our moral convictions and beliefs seems to reveal that there are ineliminable subjective factors (convictions or experiences) which serve as the ultimate grounds of our moral claims. According to the subjectivist, morality is reducible to facts about our experiences, and thus moral values are subjective (or, metaphysically “unreal,” in that they are contingent upon our particular sensibility). However, I argue that moral realism can account for the role these subjective factors play in moral deliberation, while rejecting the reduction proposed by the subjectivist. In the first three chapters, I consider the motivation for moral subjectivism and examine the subjectivist analysis of moral values and judgments. Moral subjectivism faces several difficulties: it seems to imply that moral error is impossible and that moral disagreements are rationally irresolvable. These difficulties are connected to problems with the subjectivist account of moral justification, and the notion of moral truth which flows from this view. In later chapters, I turn to the issue of how moral realism can account for the subjective factors which seem to motivate and inform our moral values and claims. Drawing from work by John McDowell and David Wiggins (for example), I argue that even if subjects are made aware of moral value via subjective experience, moral value itself is not reducible to those experiences, which are best regarded as indicative, rather than constitutive, of moral value. I also consider how moral realism can account for moral diversity, particularly the idea that what one ought to do is often conditioned by the kind of person one is, which includes what one believes to be (morally) important and the commitments one has. I conclude that moral realism provides a more adequate account of morality than subjectivist rivals, insofar as it makes sense of the existence of apparently non-subjective constraints on how we judge and deliberate as moral agents. I also suggest that the notion of moral seriousness—characterized by a concern to deliberate and choose correctly, in response to considerations which seem to exert pressure on us independently of our particular feelings and preferences—calls for the adoption of a realist framework.

MASTER’S THESIS SUMMARY: Suicide & the Self (Spring 2004): Suicide has no univocal moral status, and so is neither always immoral nor always irrational. I examine the relationship between suicide and the existential concepts (or conditions) of anxiety and despair—particularly as dealt with by Kierkegaard and Heidegger. The application of these concepts to the problem of suicide offers a fruitful way of understanding suicidal motivation. Moral criticism and intervention should be sensitive to the perspective provided by this account, and should proceed with caution given the untenability of absolutist prohibitions against suicide.

REFERENCES:
Edward Minar, University of Arkansas, Department of Philosophy, 318 Old Main, Fayetteville, AR, 72701, Ph. (479) 575-8712, E-mail: eminar@uark.edu
Richard Lee, University of Arkansas, Department of Philosophy, 318 Old Main, Fayetteville, AR, 72701, Ph. (479) 575-5826, E-mail: rlee@uark.edu
Lynne Spellman, University of Arkansas, Department of Philosophy, 318 Old Main, Fayetteville, AR, 72701, Ph. (479) 575-5973, E-mail: spellman@uark.edu
Jack Lyons, University of Arkansas, Department of Philosophy, 318 Old Main, Fayetteville, AR, 72701, Ph. (479) 575-5825, E-mail: jclyons@uark.edu
Dereck Daschke, Truman State University, Department of Philosophy and Religion, Kirksville, MO, 63501, Ph. (660) 665-6005, E-mail: ddaschke@truman.edu